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The legal standards the United States Supreme Court has developed
concerning sexual harassment law do not always reflect the reality of
how sexual harassment operates in the workplace. In particular, the
Court's recent decisions in Faragherv. City ofBoca Raton' and Burlington
Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,2 while creating an affirmative defense for
employers in cases of supervisory harassment, result in a significant
burden on the harassed employee to come forward and report the
harassment as early as possible. While this might make sense in terms
of giving the employer the opportunity to nip the harassment in the bud,
it does not reflect the manner in which many women3 respond to
harassment. By ignoring or simply disbelieving the explanations of
women who try to explain their behavior, the courts have ignored
women's stories, which are grounded in the realities of a working
woman's life. Instead, the courts have engaged in "assumptions" about
the way women "should" or "ought" to behave, creating standards that
many women can not meet. The result is that the courts' legal standards
and the factual assumptions that underlie those standards, rather than
tending to eliminate harassment in the workplace, tend to let it flourish.
The two-pronged defense set up by the Court in these cases has
given lower courts the fuel they need to engage in assumptions about the
manner in which victims of harassment "should" behave. These
"assumptions" all too often do not reflect reality. How do we know this?
* Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock William H. Bowen
School of Law. I would like to thank Linda Hamilton Krieger and Susan Bisom-Rapp
for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article as well as Louise Lowe of the
UALR Law Library for tracking down many of the sources cited in this article. Special
thanks go to Erin Vinett, a third year student at UALR, for her helpful research
assistance. Finally, I must thank Patti Stanley, symposium editor for the UALR Law
Review, and the UALR editorial board and staff for their support of the symposium at
which this paper was delivered.
1. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
2. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
3. In the course of this essay, I will discuss harassment of women and will refer
to victims of harassment as "she." This is not intended to suggest that men are not
harassed or that harassment of men is not an important issue. Rather, studies suggest
that victims of harassment are most often female, and social scientists, the studies of
whom are fundamental to many of the positions I take in this paper, have focused on
sexual harassment of women by men. Thus, I have chosen to use harassment of women
by men as the prototypical form of harassment discussed in this paper.
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We know this because just as the courts have sought to address the issue
of sexual harassment in the workplace, so too have social scientists over
the past twenty years sought to study and offer explanations of how
sexual harassment operates in the workplace. It is based on their
research as well as some basic medical diagnoses that I suggest the
Court did not set the correct standard for assessing when employers
should be held liable for harassment by supervisors.
My particular concern is with the increasing obligation the lower
courts (after Ellerth and Faragher) have put on victims of harassment to
report the behavior as early as possible. In many cases, as I will describe
below, the courts have deemed unreasonable as a matter of law plain-
tiffs' failure to apprise their employers of harassers' behaviors at the
earliest opportunity, thereby supporting the employer's establishment
of the second prong of the Ellerth/Faragher defense. Yet, a review of the
manner in which victims of harassment behave-behavior that is quite
understandable after a review of some of the medical evidence and
social facts surrounding the responses to the types of behaviors they
experience-reveals that it is not unreasonable for victims of harassment
to hesitate before reporting harassing incidents. Indeed, from the
employer's perspective, it may not be desirable for employees to report
relatively minor incidents.
In this essay, I begin by discussing some of the basics of harass-
ment law, in particular, focusing on the second prong of the newly-
created defense established in the Ellerth and Faragher decisions. I then
discuss what social science and medical science tell us about how
people respond to the types of stresses experienced by victims of sexual
harassment. Finally, I explain why the current standards used by the
courts in sexual harassment cases fail to reflect the manner in which
victims of harassment respond to harassing behaviors, thereby ignoring
the stories of women who are harassed.
II. BASICS OF HARASSMENT LAW
Like many other legal claims, there are a number of elements a
plaintiff must allege and ultimately prove in order to state a claim and
eventually prevail in a sexual harassment (or any other type of harass-
ment) case brought under Title VII. While the eleven federal circuits
formulate the elements of the claim with slight variations, I will rely on
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit's interpreta-
tion, because that is where this symposium is being conducted. In Davis
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v. City ofSioux City,4 the Eighth Circuit stated that a plaintiff must allege
and prove the following elements: (1) plaintiff is in a protected group;
(2) plaintiff was subject to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment
was based on plaintiffs protected status; (4) the harassment was
sufficiently severe or pervasive to affect a term, condition, or privilege
of plaintiff's employment; and (5) the employer knew or should have
known of the harassment and failed to take proper remedial action.5 This
fifth element has been changed to the vicarious liability standard of
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton6 and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth
in cases of supervisor harassment, and is subject to a newly-created
affirmative defense. This defense is the focus of my comments today.
The Ellerth/Faragher defense consists of two necessary elements
that must be proven by the defendant employer by a preponderance of
the evidence. First, the employer must show "that the employer
exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually
harassing behavior."8 Second, the employer must show "that the plaintiff
employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or
corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm
otherwise."9 The Court made clear in both opinions that the defense
could be used to limit liability or damages."0
In addition, the Court also described what evidence might suffice
to prove the affirmative defense:
While proof that an employer had promulgated an anti-harassment
policy with complaint procedure is not necessary in every instance as
a matter of law, the need for a stated policy suitable to the employ-
ment circumstances may appropriately be addressed in any case when
4. 115 F.3d 1365, 1367 n.3 (8th Cir. 1997).
5. Id. at 1368 n.5.
6. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
7. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
8. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
9. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
10. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. Few cases have even
acknowledged that the defense might merely limit damages. See, e.g., Watkins v. Prof'l.
Sec. Bureau, Ltd., No. 98-2555, 1999 WL 1032614, at **5 (4th Cir. Nov. 15, 1999)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1108 (2000); Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter
R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 296 (2d Cir. 1999); Brown v. Perry, 184 F.3d 388,397-98 (4th Cir.
1999). Indeed, the general assumption among courts appears to be that it limits liability.
See, e.g., Watkins, 1999 WL 1032614, at ** 5; Caridad, 191 F.3d at 296; Brown, 184 F.3d
at 397-98. But see Savino v. C.P. Hall Co., 199 F.3d 925, 934-35 (7th Cir. 1999)
(including jury instructions that defense might limit damages rather than liability);
Phillips v. Taco Bell Corp., 156 F.3d 884, 889 (8th Cir. 1998) (suggesting the defense
might be used to limit damages).
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litigating the first element of the defense. And while proof that an
employee failed to fulfill the corresponding obligation of reasonable
care to avoid harm is not limited to showing any unreasonable failure
to use any complaint procedure provided by the employer, a demon-
stration of such failure will normally suffice to satisfy the employer's
burden under the second element of the defense.I
Thus, the existence, use, and effectiveness of an employer's anti-sexual
harassment policy can have a significant impact on an employer's
ability to establish the defense.
A. Case Law Interpreting the Ellerth/Faragher Defense
While the lower courts have just begun to assess the applicability
and contours of the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense, several themes
have already begun to emerge. First, although the courts are careful to
note that an employer's anti-harassment policy does not, in and of itself,
meet the requirements of the defense, as a practical matter, that is the
implication of many rulings to date. 2 Second, the courts appear
skeptical of plaintiffs' reasons for not reporting harassment at the
earliest opportunity, which helps employers maintain the second
element of the defense-that the plaintiff unreasonably failed "to take
advantage of preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the
employer or to avoid harm otherwise."' 3 Cases applying the defense
generally have used it as a complete defense and not simply as a means
of formulating an appropriate remedy. 4 The defense has also been used
to take cases away from the jury by the courts granting either summary
judgment orjudgment as a matter of law. " It is the courts' interpretation
of the second element of the defense that is of particular relevance for
purposes of my comments today.
11. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; see also Fatiagher,-524 U.S. at 807-08.
12. See, e.g., Watkins, 1999 WL 1032614, at **4; Caridad, 191 F.3d at 295; Brown,
184 F.3d at 398. But see Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Dept., 174 F.3d 95, 118 (3d Cir.
1998) (finding that employer could not hide behind anti-harassment policy to assert
Ellerth/Faragher defense where it clearly failed to implement its own policy).
13. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
14. See supra note 10.
15. See, e.g., Watkins, 1999 WL 1032614, at **1 (upholding judgment as a matter
of law); Coates v. Sundor Brands, Inc., 164 F.3d 1361, 1366 (1lth Cir. 1999)
(upholding summary judgment on defense). But see Phillips, 156 F.3d at 889-90
(reversing district court's grant of summary judgment for jury to consider defense).
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1. The Effect ofan Anti-Harassment Policy Generally'6
Before discussing the lower courts' interpretations of the second
element of the defense, it is important to acknowledge the effect of an
employer's anti-harassment policy. The Court in Ellerth and Faragher
laid the foundation for an employer's anti-harassment policy to form the
building blocks for an employer to establish this defense. 17 The lower
courts have picked up on this but have acknowledged that simply
implementing an anti-sexual harassment policy may not insulate an
employer from liability." However, implementation of such a policy
often seems to have the net effect of satisfying the first prong of the
defense in many cases. 9 As the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit explained in Watkins v. Professional Security Bureau, Ltd.,2
the sexual harassment policy's "existence... militates strongly in favor
of a conclusion that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent
and promptly correct sexual harassment."21
In addition, the employer's anti-harassment policy is also useful in
meeting the second prong of the defense-that the employee unreason-
ably failed to take advantage of corrective opportunities offered by the
16. Before going into the application of the defense by the lower federal courts,
it is important to note that there are several issues developed by the Court in Ellerth and
Faragher with respect to the application of the defense that will not be discussed
because they are beyond the scope of this essay. First, who is a supervisor for purposes
of the defense will not be discussed. Also, what constitutes a "tangible employment
action" for purposes of quid pro quo liability will not be discussed. Finally, what
constitutes sufficiently severe or pervasive harassment will not be covered in this essay.
Instead, this essay will focus on lower courts' interpretations and applications of the
second prong of the defense.
17. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08.
18. See, e.g., Watkins, 1999 WL 1032614, at **4; Hurley, 174 F.3d at 118. For the
Fourth Circuit's rule regarding unpublished decisions, see FOURTH CIR. R. 36(c).
Recently, the Eighth Circuit held that unpublished opinions were unconstitutional,
calling into question the federal courts' use of such dispositions. Anastasoffv. United
States, 223 F.3d 898, 900 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as moot, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir.
2000) (en banc); see also Richard S. Arnold, Unpublished Opinions: A Comment, I J. APP.
PRAC. & PROCESS 219 (1999).
19. See, e.g., Watkins, 1999 WL 1032614, at *4; Caridad, 191 F.3d at 295; Brown,
184 F.3d at 395; Shaw v. AutoZone, Inc., 180 F.3d 806, 811 (7th Cir. 1999) ("[T]he
existence of an appropriate anti-harassment policy will often satisfy this first prong.").
But see Hurley, 174 F.3d at 118 (employer could not hide behind anti-harassment policy
to assert Ellerth/Faragher defense where it clearly failed to implement its own policy).
20. No. 98-2555, 1999 WL 1032614, at **4 (4th Cir. Nov. 15, 1999) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1108 (2000).
21. Id. (quoting Brown v. Perry, 184 F.3d 388, 396 (4th Cir. 1999)) (internal
quotations omitted); see also Caridad, 191 F.3d at 295 (finding existence of policy and




employer or to avoid harm otherwise. Indeed, in many cases described
in more detail below, the courts have placed a significant burden on the
plaintiff to report harassment pursuant to such an employer policy, even
though the burden of proof for the affirmative defense is on the
defendant. As one court put it:
[T]he law against sexual harassment is not self-enforcing and an
employer cannot be expected to correct harassment unless the
employee makes a concerted effort to inform the employer that a
problem exists. ... In short, Shaw [the plaintiff] acted in precisely the
manner that a victim of sexual harassment should not act in order to
win recovery under the new law.22
Bearing the importance of the employer's sexual harassment policy in
mind, what follows is an analysis of relevant trends in the circuits in
applying the second element of the defense.
2. Courts Often Reject Employee's "Reasonable" Attempts To
Thwart Harassment
23
The courts' interpretations of this prong have involved several
issues, including: (1) what constitutes a reasonable excuse for not using
an employer's anti-sexual harassment policy; (2) how long of a delay in
22. Shaw, 180 F.3d at 813 (emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted).
23. At the outset, it is a bit unclear how the two elements of the second prong of
the defense interact. The literal language from the Court's decisions is as follows: "The
defense comprises two necessary elements: (a) that the employer exercised reasonable
care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the
plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or
corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise." Ellerth,
524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. Some courts seemingly have assumed that
ifthe employee either takes advantage ofthe employer's complaint procedure oravoids
harm otherwise, the employer will not be able to establish prong two of the defense.
See, e.g., Williams v. Multnomah Educ. Serv. Dist., No. 97-1197-ST, 1999 WL 454633,
at *9- 10 (D. Or. Apr. 14, 1999). On the other hand, some courts have suggested that if
the employer can show that the employee either unreasonably failed to use the
complaint procedure or failed to avoid harm otherwise, the employer will establish the
second element of the defense. See, e.g., Brown, 184 F.3d at 397. Given the language of
the defense, it appears that the former reading is more likely what the Court intended.
The language from Ellerth and Faragher is that "the plaintiff employee unreasonably
failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities by the employer
or to avoid harm otherwise." Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. The
disjunctive portion of the sentence appears to go to what the employee unreasonably
failed to do--not what the employer must show to establish this element of the defense.
Thus, the employer must show that the employee unreasonably failed to do both in
order to establish the defense. This follows from basic rules about parallelism. See
CLAIRE KEHRWALD COOK, LINE BY LIE: How To EDrr YouR OwN WRrrING 61, 61-69
(1995).
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reporting harassment is "unreasonable" along with what kinds of
excuses for delaying or not reporting harassment are acceptable; and (3)
whether an employee is unreasonable in reporting "improperly" under
the employer's policy. Thus, although the defendant has the obligation
of proving the defense by a preponderance of the evidence, the cases
often focus on the behavior of the victim.
a. What is a reasonable excuse for an employee's failure to
use the employer's anti-harassment policy?
There are very few circumstances under which a court will deem an
employee's reasons for not using the employer's anti-harassment policy
reasonable. The EEOC has explained that an employee is reasonable in
not using a policy where: (1) the "complaint mechanism entailed a risk
of retaliation," (2) "there were obstacles to complaints," and (3) "the
complaint mechanism was not effective." '24 However, the courts have
been more narrow in their approach.
A plaintiff's refusal to report harassment because of potential
repercussions has met with mixed results in providing a plaintiff with
an excuse for not reporting harassment or delaying reporting harass-
ment.25 In many cases, the courts have held that such fears would not
excuse an employee's failure to report harassment early on.26 The courts
24. Enforcement Guidance: Vicarious Employer Liability for Unlawful Harassment by
Supervisors, 3 EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) N:4075, at 31 (June 18, 1999) [hereinafter
Enforcement Guidance].
25. See, e.g., Desmarteau v. City of Wichita, Kansas, 64 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1080
(D. Kan. 1999) (holding fear of repercussions insufficient where "[s]uch ajustification
lacks any objectively reasonable basis in the record"); Robinson v. Truman Coll., No.
97-C-896, 1999 WL 33887, at *7 (N.D. Il1. Jan. 19, 1999) (finding plaintiff
unreasonable in not reporting due to her unsubstantiated fear for her job); Fierro v. Saks
Fifth Ave., 13 F. Supp. 2d 481, 492 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding employee unreasonable
in failing to complain based on "generalized fear" of repercussions). But see Caridad,
191 F.3d at 295 (indicating that reluctance to report based on apprehension of what
employer might do may preclude defense); Maple v. Publ'ns Int'l Ltd., No. 99-C-6936,
2000 WL 1029112, at *5 (N.D. Il1. July 25, 2000) (finding plaintiffs reluctance to
report reasonable where harasser had threatened plaintiff's job, co-workers told her
nothing would be done and retaliation would result); Meng v. Ipanema Shoe Corp., 73
F. Supp. 2d 392, 402 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding issue of fact existed as to
reasonableness of failure to report in light of harasser's high status and threats to fire
her if she reported); Booker v. Budget Rent-A-Car Sys., 17 F. Supp. 2d 735, 747-48
(M.D. Tenn. 1998) (finding issue of fact as to whether employee was reasonable in not
complaining because of feared retaliation in racial harassment context). In Miller v.
Woodharbor Molding & Millworks, Inc., 80 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1032-33 (N.D. Iowa 2000),
the court found the employee acted reasonably in reporting harassment to a supervisor
who then reported it to someone who could act on behalf of the company.
26. See, e.g., Caridad, 191 F.3d at 295 (noting that reluctance to report based on
2001]
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in these cases characterized the victim's fears as "unsubstantiated, 27 too
"generalized,"28 or lacking in "any objectively reasonable basis. '29 In
Fierro v. Saks Fifth Avenue,3" the court explained the reasons for its
reluctance to allow the threat of repercussions to justify an employee's
failure to report:
[E]very employee who feels harassed by a supervisor will at some
level fear the inevitable unpleasantness which will result from
complaining to the employer. Confrontation is by its very nature
unpleasant. However, to allow an employee to circumvent the
reasonable complaint requirements of Faragher and Burlington, by
making conclusory allegations of feared repercussions would
effectively eviscerate an affirmative defense which the Supreme
Court clearly went to great effort to craft in order to stem the tide of
unwarranted lawsuits.
31
As social science tells us, however, the fear for theirjobs, for their
families (and their reactions), of embarrassment, and of not being
believed are not fears of mere "unpleasantness." They are supported by
the impact of harassment on those who report harassment-impacts that
result in lost jobs and discord at home. If the plaintiff can come up with
"objective" evidence, courts have been more likely to allow the issue to
go to the jury.32 However, many plaintiffs' lawyers would tell you that
once an employee complains about discrimination on the job, he or she
apprehension of what employer might do may preclude defense); Desmarteau, 64 F.
Supp. 2d at 1080 (finding fear of repercussions insufficient where "[s]uch ajustification
lacks any objectively reasonable basis in the record"); Robinson, 1999 WL 33887, at * 7
(finding plaintiff unreasonable in not reporting due to her unsubstantiated fear for her
job); Fierro, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 492 (finding employee unreasonable in failing to
complain based on "generalized fear" of repercussions).
27. Robinson, 1999 WL 33887, at *7 (holding that plaintiffwas unreasonable in not
reporting due to her unsubstantiated fear for her job).
28. Fierro, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 492 (holding that employee was unreasonable in
failing to complain based on "generalized fears" of repercussions).
29. Desmarteau, 64 F. Supp. 2d at 1080 (finding fear of repercussions insufficient
where "[s]uch a justification lacks any objectively reasonable basis in the record").
30. 13 F. Supp. 2d 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
31. Id. at 492.
32. See generally Maple, 2000 WL 1029112, at *5 (finding plaintiff's reluctance to
report reasonable where harasser had threatened plaintiffs job, co-workers told her
nothing would be done, and retaliation would result); Meng, 73 F. Supp. 2d at 402
(holding issue of fact existed as to reasonableness of failure to report in light of
harasser's high status and threats to fire her if she reported); Booker, 17 F. Supp. 2d at
747-48 (finding issue of fact as to whether employee was reasonable in not complaining
because of feared retaliation in racial harassment context); Fierro, 13 F. Supp. 2d at
492-93 (noting that plaintiffdid not specify repercussions he feared or other employees
who were subject to retaliation for complaining).
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can usually consider that employment relationship over.33 Thus, these
fears are rarely, if ever, erroneous.
Even in cases in which an employee knows nothing about the
employer's policy, the court may deem her failure to use the policy
unreasonable.' In Watkins v. Professional Security Bureau, Ltd.," the
plaintiff testified that she was unaware of the employer's anti-harass-
ment policy. The court held that she could be found "constructively
aware" based on the employer's placing the policy in the employee
handbook (which the plaintiff stated she never received), posting the
policy in an area frequented by employees, and placing the employee
handbook at work sites.' "Under these circumstances, a reasonable jury
could only conclude that Watkins was at least constructively aware of
the policy."37 This, in part, formed the basis for granting judgment for
the defendant in this case. 8
33. See E. RICHARD LARSON, SUE YOUR Boss: RIGHTS AND REMEDIES FOR
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION XVIII (1981) (noting that victims ofdiscrimination "must
evaluate the risk of retaliation versus [their] courage to seek [their] federal rights to
non-discrimination"); Dominic Bencivenga, Retaliation Claims: Employers Face Charges
of Unfair Treatment, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 14, 1996, at 5 (noting rise in retaliation claims);
Teresa L. Butler & A. Michael Weber, Retaliation Lawsuits Are Increasing Rapidly, 20
NAT'L L.J. B5 (1999) (same). See generally Valerie Harris, Note, Front Pay and Sexual
Harassment Cases: What It Is, Why It Is Important and How To Make It Better, 7 WM. &
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 217, 224-25 (2000) (explaining why reinstatement is rarely an
appropriate remedy in these cases).
34. See, e.g., Watkins v. Prof'l. Sec. Bureau, Ltd., No. 98-2555, 1999 WL 1032614,
at **5 (4th Cir. Nov. 15, 1999) (per curiam), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1108 (2000); Shaw
v. AutoZone, Inc., 180 F.3d 806, 811 (7th Cir. 1999). But see Brandrup v. Starkey, 30
F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1289 (D. Or. 1998) (finding employee reasonable in not reporting
when she knew nothing about policy).
35. No. 98-2555, 1999 WL 1032614, at **5 (4th Cir. Nov. 15, 1999) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1108 (2000).
36. Id. at **5 n.15.
37. Id. Apparently, the jury that heard and initially decided this case was not so
"reasonable." The actual jury found for the plaintiffon her hostile environment claim
and awarded Watkins $63,000 in damages. Id. at **2. The district court ultimately
granted a motion for judgment as a matter of law or in the alternative a new trial on the
hostile environment claim, which was upheld by the Court of Appeals. Id. In Shaw, 180
F.3d at 811, where plaintiff signed an acknowledgment that stated "I understand it is
my responsibility to read and learn the policies and procedures contained in the
AutoZone Handbook and Safety Booklet," which contained anti-harassment policy, the
court held that the plaintiff had "constructive knowledge" of the policy. Compare
Brandrup, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 1289 (holding that plaintiffwas reasonable in not using a
policy that she knew nothing about).
38. Watkins, 1999 WL 1032614, at ** 5.
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b. The effect of an employee's delay in using the policy
If a plaintiff delays in reporting harassment pursuant to an employer
policy, many courts appear to find that the employee has acted unrea-
sonably as a matter of law in failing to report the harassment sooner.
Courts have held employee delays from three months to two years
unreasonable.39 As the court in Savino explained, "unreasonable foot-
dragging will result in at least a partial reduction of damages, and may
completely foreclose liability."' ° The showing of plaintiffs' delay helps
defendants establish the second element of the defense.
While the plaintiffs in these cases tried to explain their reasons for
delaying reporting the harassment, many courts have been unreceptive
to such explanations. As the court in Caridad explained:
We do not doubt that there are many reasons why a victimized
employee may be reluctant to report acts of workplace harassment,
but for that reluctance to preclude the employer's affirmative defense,
it must be based on apprehension of what the employer might do, not
merely on concern about the reaction of co-workers.4'
In Desmarteau v. City of Wichita, Kansas42 to whom the plaintiff asserted
that she feared retaliation from the supervisor she was reporting and
therefore delayed reporting.43 The court held her delay unreasonable as
a matter of law, stating that "[s]uch ajustification lacks any objectively
39. See, e.g., Hill v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 218 F.3d 639, 643 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding
that plaintiff did not take advantage of corrective opportunities by writing anonymous
letter and letter signed by fictitious person; she did when she finally wrote and signed
a letter under her own name complaining about the behavior); Casiano v. AT&T Corp.,
213 F.3d 278, 287 (5th Cir. 2000) (granting summary judgment where plaintiff
"suffered at least fifteen propositions yet never reported any of the incidents until
months after the last of them"); Savino v. C.P. Hall Co., 199 F.3d 925, 933 (7th Cir.
1999) (four month delay); Watkins, 1999 WL 1032614, at *1 (four month delay in
reporting rape); Montero v. AGCO Corp., 192 F.3d 856, 863 (9th Cir. 1999) (two year
delay unreasonable); Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 290 (2d
Cir. 1999) (several month delay); Desmarteau v. City of Wichita, Kansas, 64 F. Supp.
2d 1067, 1080 (D. Kan. 1999) (finding delay of five months unreasonable); Mandy v.
Quad/Graphics, Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 1095, 1111 (E.D. Wis. 1999) (holding delay oftwo
years unreasonable in light of anti-harassment procedure's inclusion of anti-retaliation
provision and confidential nature).
40. Savino, 199 F.3d at 935.
41. 191 F.3d at 295; see also Shaw, 180 F.3d at 813 (plaintiffs excuse for not
reporting that she did not feel "comfortable enough" with anyone at the employer to
discuss the harassment with them was not reasonable).
42. 64 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1080 (D. Kan. 1999).
43. Id.
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reasonable basis in the record."' Instead, the employer's policy allowed
the plaintiff to bypass her supervisor in making the complaint. There
also was no evidence that the employer's policy was somehow
inadequate or unenforced.45
Watkins v. Professional Security Bureau, Ltd.,46 provides another
example of such a case. In Watkins, the plaintiff delayed four months
(from May to September) before reporting a rape by her supervisor." In
July and mid-August, she did inform her employer of an incident
involving the same supervisor during which he fondled her breasts and
put his hands down her pants as she was changing into her uniform for
work.48 The plaintiff, at that time, indicated that she did not want to
pursue the matter.49 She eventually did inform her employer about the
rape as well.5" The court concluded this evidence was sufficient to
support the defendant's burden on the second element of the defense as
a matter of law:
Here, there is no dispute that Watkins did not report the rape by
Kelley [the harasser] pursuant to PSB's anti-harassment policy, which
required that she contact the director of human resources. And, while
Watkins told Dowling [the site supervisor] that Kelley had fondled
her breasts and placed his hands down her pants, she repeatedly
expressed her unwillingness to pursue the matter. Watkins testified
that her failure to report the incident promptly and fully resulted from
embarrassment and fear of reprisal. This evidence, however, is
insufficient as a matter of law to establish that Watkins acted
reasonably in failing to report Kelley according to the anti-harassment
policy .... Accordingly, we hold that no reasonable jury could have
concluded that PSB failed to establish the second prong of the
affirmative defense.5'
In spite of the court's assumption about the manner in which
Watkins should have responded to these very disturbing acts of
44. Id.
45. Id.; see also Caridad, 191 F.3d at 290 (finding plaintiff's belief that pressing
complaint would not "improve matters" insufficient); Shaw, 180 F.3d at 813 ("[A]n
employee's subjective fears of confrontation, unpleasantness or retaliation do not
alleviate the employee's duty under Ellerth to alert the employer to the allegedly hostile
environment.").
46. No. 98-2555, 1999 WL 1032614 (4th Cir. Nov. 15, 1999) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 529 U.S. 1108 (2000).




51. Id. at **5 (citations and footnotes omitted).
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harassment, there may be a very reasonable explanation for why she
delayed reporting the rape and why she was reluctant to have the
employer pursue her claim, as I explain below.
Some courts have been a bit more lenient in their interpretation of
the second element and employee excuses for delays, at least under the
right circumstances. In Johnson v. West, 2 the court remanded to the
district court, holding that a trier of fact could find that the employer
failed to meet the second element of the defense even where the
employee delayed a year in reporting the harassment." In that case,
there was evidence that the plaintiff had been threatened and intimidated
by the harasser. 4 The court noted that there was evidence that the
plaintiff was under "severe emotional and psychological stress as a
result of the harassment."" Under these circumstances, an issue of fact
remained as to the reasonableness of the plaintiff's failure to take
advantage of corrective opportunities. 6 In Maple v. Publications
International, Ltd.," the court ruled that the plaintiff's reluctance to
report harassment was not unreasonable as a matter of law where the
plaintiff expressed fear of retaliation."8 The harasser had threatened the
plaintiff's job when she refused his advances. In addition, other
employees told her human resources would do nothing and she would
be retaliated against if she reported the harassment. 9 Thematically, these
cases involved some proof of threats. But should a plaintiff be required
to show evidence of an overt threat to her job in order to be excused in
not reporting harassment? Or should the potential for a bad outcome be
assumed until the employer proves otherwise?
A more reasonable approach was used by a court in the District of
Columbia Circuit. In Greene v. Dalton,6' the court recognized that "[t]he
52. 218 F.3d 725 (7th Cir. 2000).




57. No. 99-C-6936, 2000 WL 1029112 (N.D. I11. July 25, 2000).
58. Id. at *5.
59. Id But see Robinson v. Truman Coll., No. 97-C0896, 1999 WL 33887, at *7
(N.D. II1. Jan. 19, 1999) (holding plaintiff unreasonable in waiting three months to
report harassment allegedly due to her unsubstantiated fear for her job); Jones v. USA
Petroleum Corp., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1379, 1386 (S.D. Ga. 1998) (finding conclusory
assertions of fear of repercussions insufficient tojustify employee's failure to complain
and support summary judgment for defendant on defense); Fierro v. Saks Fifth Ave.,
13 F. Supp. 2d 481, 491 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) ("[G]eneralized fears [of repercussions] can
never constitute reasonable grounds for an employee's failure to complain to his or her
employer.").
60. 164 F.3d 671 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
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'failure to avail' standard is not intended to punish the plaintiff merely
for being dilatory."'" The court reasoned that the employee's delay must
be considered in light of when the harassment reached an actionable
level:
In order for the Navy to avoid all liability based upon its Faragher
defense, therefore, it must show not merely that Greene inexcusably
delayed reporting the alleged rape-which is what it emphasizes on
brief-but that, as a matter of law, a reasonable person in Greene's
place would have come forward early enough to prevent Clause's [the
harasser's] harassment from becoming "severe or pervasive."
62
Because there was little evidence regarding the harasser's behavior
toward the plaintiff during her first ten days of work at the Navy, the
court could not decide as a matter of law that the plaintiff's delay was
unreasonable.63 Likewise, in Watts v. Kroger Co.," the Fifth Circuit
reversed in part the granting of summary judgment because ajury could
find that waiting a couple months to report the harassment was not
unreasonable, where the supervisor's harassment intensified in the
Spring of 1994, and she reported the harassment in July of 1994.65 The
courts in these cases appeared to understand why a plaintiff might not
report the first incidents and conceded that it might be reasonable to
delay until the harassment reaches an actionable level.
3. An Employee's Failure To Use the Policy Precisely
There is also a developing split about the reasonableness of an
employee complaining outside the "official" employer's policy dictates
(for example, complaining to a union representative). In Madray v.
Publix Supermarkets, Inc.," the court held that the plaintiffs failed to
avoid harm otherwise by complaining "informally" to mid-level
managers who were not designated in the policy to receive complaints.67
Likewise, in DeCesare v. National Railroad Passenger Corp.," the court
held that plaintiff s informing her union representative (because she was
61. Id. at 674.
62. Id. at 675.
63. Id.
64. 170 F.3d 505 (5th Cir. 1999).
65. Id. at 510.
66. 208 F.3d 1290 (1lth Cir. 2000).
67. Id. at 1302.
68. No. CNA 98-3851, 1999 WL 330258 (E.D. Pa. May 24, 1999).
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more comfortable doing so) was insufficient notice to the employer.69
While her subsequent grievance did put the employer on notice of the
harassment, the court still held that she failed to "take advantage of any
preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer"
because she did not use the employer's anti-harassment policy.70
Other courts have responded more sympathetically to plaintiffs. In
Williams v. Multnomah Education Service District,71 a district court
decided there was an issue of fact as to whether an employee's failure
to use an employer's grievance system was reasonable, given that the
employee notified his supervisor and union representative. Similarly,
in Gordon v. Southern Bells, Inc.,73 an issue of fact existed as to the
second prong of the defense where the employee did not fill out the
appropriate form dictated by the employer's policy or complain to a
"manager" as provided in the policy.74 Instead, the plaintiff reported the
harassment to a co-owner of the company.71 Some courts have character-
ized this as the plaintiff's attempt to "avoid harm otherwise. ' 6
These cases reveal that many courts are engaging in pro-employer
readings of the Ellerth/Faragher defense and are making assumptions
about how a plaintiff should or should not behave. This is typical of
standards that involve "reasonableness" determinations about the
victim's actions. The court will substitute its own judgment of what is
69. Id. at *5.
70. Id. But see Distasio v. Perkin Elmer Corp., 157 F.3d 55, 64 (2d Cir. 1998).
There, the judge stated:
While the fact that a complaint was unreported may be relevant in
considering whether an employer had knowledge of the alleged conduct, an
employer is not necessarily insulated from Title VII liability simply because
a plaintiff does not invoke her employer's internal grievance procedure ifthe
failure to report is attributable to the conduct of the employer or its agent.
Id.
71. No. 97-1197-ST, 1999 WL454633 (D. Or. Apr. 14, 1999).
72. Id. at *9-10.
73. 67 F. Supp. 2d 966 (S.D. Ind. 1999).
74. Id. at 983.
75. Id; see also Cadena v. Pacesetter Corp., 224 F.3d 1203, 1214 (10th Cir. 2000)
(holding that evidence of plaintiffs only female supervisor's sexual relationship with
harasser relevant to whether plaintiff's decision not to report harassment to that
supervisor was reasonable); Cherry v. Menard, Inc., 101 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1178 (N.D.
Iowa 2000) (finding an issue of fact as to whether employee "avoided harm otherwise"
by making a complaint to a friend who was a manager as well); Miller v. Woodharbor
Molding & Millworks, Inc., 80 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1032 (N.D. Iowa 2000) (finding that
plaintiff was reasonable in reporting to a supervisor who was her friend because of her
concern over the friendship between harasser and ultimate supervisor).
76. See, e.g., Watts, 170 F.3d at 511; Miller, 80 F. Supp. 2d at 1033; Williams, 1999
WL 454633, at * 10; see also Enforcement Guidance, supra note 24, at 32 (supporting this
interpretation).
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reasonable under the circumstances even though case after case and
study after study reveal that victims do not behave consistently with the
court's notion of reasonableness.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF SCIENTIFIC FINDINGS ON HARASSMENT LAW
There are two types of evidence that should be helpful in explaining
women's responses to incidents of harassment. One comes from medical
science. As I explain below, plaintiffs should use evidence of post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) to explain why they do not report
harassment or delay in reporting harassment. Evidence of PTSD is
especially helpful in cases of extreme harassment-incidents involving
rape or physical abuse-in which it is more likely than not that the
victim will experience PTSD. Another helpful form of evidence comes
from traditional social science-what I will refer to as "social context"
evidence. This evidence is useful to explain why victims of harassment
might not complain in situations where the harassment is less extreme
than those that would normally trigger PTSD. The combination of the
findings from medical science as well as social science provides a
reasonable explanation of victims' responses to harassment.
A. Medical Evidence
PTSD provides a viable evidentiary explanation for the reluctance
of victims of harassment to report that behavior. Medical science tells
us that women or men who have been physically or sexually assaulted
in the course of being sexually harassed may suffer from post-traumatic
stress disorder. While the common perception of sexual harassment
among the public is that it involves fairly "minor" conduct, such as
commenting on someone's dress or asking someone out on a date, many
cases do contain allegations of physical or sexual assault." In addition,
PTSD can be triggered by less severe incidents for persons who have
suffered from PTSD in the past (for example, have been sexually or
physically assaulted or sexually or physically abused as a child).78
77. See, e.g., Gretzinger v. Univ. of Haw., No. 97-15123, 1998 WL 403357 (9th
Cir. July 7, 1998) (plaintiff sexually assaulted on numerous occasions); Nichols v. Am.
Nat'l Ins. Co., 154 F.3d 875, 881 (8th Cir. 1998) (attempted rape); Nichols v. Frank,
42 F.3d 503, 507 (9th Cir. 1994) (plaintiff forced to perform oral sex on supervisor)
abrogation on other grounds recognized in Burrell v. Star Nursery, Inc., 170 F.3d 951, 955
(9th Cir. 1999); Townsend v. Ind. Univ., 995 F.2d 691, 692 (7th Cir. 1993) (plaintiff
claimed PTSD as a result of two sexual assaults by her supervisor).
78. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC AssOCIATION, DIAGNosTICAND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
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Medical studies show that more than half of victims of rape experience
PTSD.79 Thus, it is more likely than not that a victim of sexual harass-
ment who is raped during the harassment will experience PTSD. As I
explain below, evidence of PTSD should be admissible to explain the
plaintiff's behavior. Indeed, many cases mention that the victim has
been diagnosed as suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder." Yet,
few cases outside of the damages phase8 discuss how PTSD might
MENTAL DISORDERS 424 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV]; see also Jessica Wolfe,
et al., Sexual Harassment and Assault as Predictors of PTSD Symptomatology Among US.
Female Persian Gulf War Military Personnel, 13 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 40, 54 (1998)
(reporting results of study of female Gulf War Veterans that "suggest[s] that the
frequency of less severe events (i.e., physical sexual harassment) has the greatest
impact on women who also experience more severe forms of sexual victimization").
But see Louise F. Fitzgerald et al., Junk Logic: The Abuse Defense in Sexual Harassment
Litigation, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 730 (1999) (arguing there is no scientific
evidence supporting hypersensitivity of all sexual abuse victims). Prior exposure to
traumatic events that create PTSD is quite high among women in the United States. See
Heidi S. Resnick et al., Prevalence of Civilian Trauma and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder
in a Representative National Sample of Women, 61 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL.
984, 988 (1993) (finding that seventy percent of respondent women had experienced
one or more traumatic criminal victimization experiences, such as rape or physical
assault). Indeed, one study showed that "a substantial proportion of people with a
history of PTSD experience multiple episodes of the disorder associated with different
traumas." Ronald C. Kessler, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: The Burden to the Individual
and to Society, 61 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 4, 7 (Supp. 5 2000). With respect to PTSD
specifically, studies have shown a range of 7.8% to 12.3% (study of women) of the
United States population have experienced PTSD under the DSM-1II standard. Id. at 6.
For an example of a case in which PTSD was triggered by lesser incidents of
harassment due to prior abuse, see Kopp v. Samaritan Health Sys., Inc., 13 F.3d 264, 267
(8th Cir. 1993).
79. See Edgar Garcia-Rill & Erica Beecher-Monas, Gatekeeping Stress: The Science
andAdmissibility of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 9, 17
(2001).
80. See, e.g., Gotthardt v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 191 F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th
Cir. 1999); Baty v. Willamette Indus., Inc., 172 F.3d 1232, 1240 (10th Cir. 1999);
Reinhold v. Virginia, 135 F.3d 920, 928 (4th Cir. 1998), vacated on rehearing, 151 F.3d
172 (4th Cir. 1998); Nichols, 42 F.3d at 507; Townsend, 995 F.2d at 692.
81. For examples of cases using PTSD at the damages phase, see O'Rourke v. City
ofProvidence, 235 F.3d 713,733-34 (1st Cir. 2001); Gotthardt, 191 F.3d at 1152, 1155;
Skidmore v. Precision Printing & Packaging, Inc., 188 F.3d 606, 612, 614 (5th Cir.
1999); Bay, 172 F.3d at 1244; Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 162 F.3d 1062, 1068 (10th
Cir. 1998); Reinhold, 135 F.3d at 928. It is not surprising that PTSD gets mentioned in
the damages phase. Persons suffering from PTSD often take a long time to recover and
some never recover. In addition, persons suffering from PTSD are five times more
likely to be unemployed than those who are not suffering from the disorder. B.
Kathleen Jordan et al., Problems in Families of Male Vietnam Veterans with Posttraumatic
Stress Disorder, 60 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHoL. 916, 919 (1992); see also
Kessler, supra note 78, at 9 (citing study showing that the odds that respondents with
PTSD were currently unemployed was 150% compared to those without PTSD).
[Vol. 24
0EVIDENCE OF WOMEN'S STORIES
affect the victim's response to harassment. s2 Even in the damages
context, plaintiffs have had some trouble with the admissibility of PTSD
evidence. 3
In particular, evidence of PTSD would be useful in understanding
why a victim might delay reporting harassment. Victims who suffer
from PTSD will avoid any reference to the stressor, which can result in
a delay in reporting harassment. Yet, as we have seen in recent case law
on the subject, the courts often deem such delays unreasonable as a
matter of law in assessing the second prong of the Ellerth/Faragher
affirmative defense." Examining how PTSD affects victims of harass-
ment shows that their behavior is not "unreasonable," but instead
consistent with a person who is suffering from the disorder.
PTSD is a medical diagnosis contained in the American Psychiatric
Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual ofMental Disorders.5 As
such, it is a diagnosis that is generally accepted by the medical
community and, as others have argued, should be accepted as a matter
of scientific evidence by courts in appropriate cases. 6 Looking at the
requirements for the diagnosis and symptoms associated with PTSD
makes it obvious how it might help explain the actions of victims of
sexual harassment.
First, PTSD is experienced by individuals in situations "following
exposure to an extreme traumatic stressor involving direct personal
experience of an event that involves actual or threatened death or serious
injury, or other threat to one's physical integrity." ' Specifically
included in the types of threats or injuries that can lead to PTSD are
82. Indeed, the only employment discrimination case I could find where PTSD was
used as a reason for delay pre-dates Ellerth and Faragher. See Campbell v. Ingersoll
Milling Mach. Co., 893 F.2d 925 (7th Cir. 1990). In Campbell, the plaintiff alleged
discrimination based on race and sex in her firing. Id. at 926. She later tried to amend
her complaint three weeks before trial to add a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress based on a sexual assault by her supervisor. Id. at 927. The plaintiff
argued that she delayed in amending her complaint due to PTSD. Id. at 928. Indeed, she
argued that she couldn't even bring herself to tell her attorney about the assault until
it was discussed by one of her doctors during his deposition. Id. The court concluded
that it was within the discretion of the trial court to forbid amendment at that late time,
even considering Campbell's condition. Id.
83. See, e.g., Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 130 F.3d 1287, 1295-99 (8th Cir.
1997).
84. See supra notes 39-51 and accompanying text.
85. DSM-IV, supra note 78, at 424.
86. See Garcia-Rill & Beecher-Monas, supra note 79, at 29-30.
87. DSM-IV, supra note 78, at 424. PTSD can also be experienced in response to
other forms of stress. However, this seems to be the scenario most likely to be
experienced by sexual harassment victims.
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sexual assault and physical attack,88 both of which are experienced by
sexual harassment victims. 9 This diagnosis becomes significant because
of what it tells us about the manner in which people who suffer from the
disorder respond to stimuli associated with the traumatizing event. As
the DSM-IV explains, "The person commonly makes deliberate efforts
to avoid thoughts, feelings, or conversations about the traumatic event
... and to avoid activities, situations, or people who arouse recollections
of it." As will become apparent after review of the studies of social
scientists, victims of sexual harassment frequently go into "avoidance"
mode. This is consistent with the symptoms of persons experiencing
PTSD. Another facet of PTSD is that it frequently has a delayed onset.
In other words, persons who experience the stress will often have a
delay in experiencing the symptoms of PTSD.9' In addition, the duration
of the symptoms can last anywhere from within three months of the
onset to over a year.' The upshot is that a victim may be in avoidance
mode for quite some time and therefore be unable to report severe
harassment as early as the courts are demanding.
The Watkins case described above provides an example of how
PTSD evidence might be used to explain the victim's behavior. In
Watkins, the victim delayed reporting a rape for four months."3 In
addition, she did not want to pursue instances of "lesser" forms of
harassment involving the same person in the interim.94 Though no
medical diagnosis appears in the court's decision in that case, it is more
likely than not that Watkins was suffering from PTSD following the
rape. If that was indeed the case, her reasons for delaying report of the
rape as well as her avoiding further trauma with respect to the other
incidents by being reluctant to have them pursued, are entirely reason-
able given that medical diagnosis. She was behaving like persons
88. Id.
89. Id.; see cases cited supra note 77.
90. DSM-IV, supra note 78, at 424-25.
91. Id. at 426. As the manual provides, "[s]yrnptoms usually begin within the first
3 months after the trauma, although there may be a delay of months, or even years,
before symptoms appear." Id.
92. Id. It can also be much longer. Studies show the median duration of PTSD for
the worst sorts of trauma range from three years (for those being treated for the
disorder) to five years (for those who are not being treated). Kessler, supra note 78, at
7 (citing Ronald C. Kessler et al., Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in the National
Comorbidity Survey, 52 ARCHIvES GEN. PsYcHIATRY 1048 (1995)).
93. Watkins v. Professional Sec. Bureau, Ltd., No. 98-2555, 1999 WL 1032614,
at *1 n.2 (4th Cir. Nov. 15, 1999).
94. Id. at * 1. The "lesser" form of harassment included fondling the plaintiff's
breasts and the harasser's putting his hands down her pants. Id.
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suffering from PTSD behave when confronted with the stressing
incident. In this context, her behavior was reasonable and a result of the
misconduct of the harassing supervisor. Yet, the court in that case found
no liability as a matter of law.95
The strength in using PTSD evidence to explain a sexual harass-
ment victim's behavior lies in the credibility that a scientifically-based
explanation has in the courts. It should be difficult for a court to
discount or find inadmissible such a medical diagnosis in the appropri-
ate case. Attorneys representing victims of sexual harassment should
consider using PTSD evidence to support explanations of their clients'
behaviors. In addition, the courts should re-assess the assumptions they
make about the manner in which "reasonable" victims behave.
B. Social Science Evidence"
Unlike PTSD, which has long been acknowledged as a legitimate
psychiatric diagnosis, the effects of sexual harassment as a psychologi-
cal and social phenomenon have only recently been studied. Sexual
harassment on the job was not specifically studied as a workplace
phenomenon until the late 1970s.9' Over the last twenty years, social
scientists have studied it extensively. In particular, sociologists,
psychologists, psychiatrists, behavioral studies and organizational
theorists, and women's studies academics all began to look closely at
this disturbing workplace behavior. Now, over twenty years later, we
finally have some social scientific research on the phenomenon of
harassment in the workplace. This research, however, is still admittedly
in its infancy."8 And when it comes to the psychological effects, findings
are clearly preliminary. Still, social science can provide valuable
observations about the manner in which victims of sexual harassment
95. Id. at "5.
96. For a thorough analysis of how social science might affect this defense, see
Theresa M. Beiner, Sex, Science and Social Knowledge: The Implications ofSocial Science
Research on Imputing Liability to Employers for Sexual Harassment, 7 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 273 (2001); Joanna L. Grossman, The First Bite Is Free: Employer Liability
for Sexual Harassment, 61 U. Prrr. L. REv. 671 (2000).
97. Two popularly read books, Lin Farley's Sexual Shakedown and Catherine
MacKinnon's Sexual Harassment of Working Women, gave the phenomenon a wider
acknowledgment and interest. See generally LIN FARLEY, SEXUAL SHAKEDOWN: THE
SEXUAL HARASSMENrOF WOMENONTHE JOB (1978); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL
HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN (1979).




respond as well as provide social context evidence that might explain a
victim's failure to report harassment.
There are limits to the use of social science evidence in the courts.
Social science studies suffer from several methodological problems.
One main problem is definitional. There is no agreed upon definition of
sexual harassment among these academics and clinicians, and often
social scientists are using different terminology than the courts." Also,
many studies use students, rather than working populations or people
who actually have been sexually harassed."° The use of undergraduate
students is especially problematic as many test subjects have little or no
work experience. One study that provides an exception to some of these
methodological difficulties is the United States Merit Systems
Protections Board's (USMSPB) periodic studies of sexual harassment
of federal employees.' The federal government has been studying
harassment of federal employees since 1983, and has had fairly
consistent findings. I will endeavor to use the government's study as
well as studies that focus on actual victims of harassment and working
populations in assessing how victims respond.
1. What Social Science Tell Us About Application of Prong Two of
the Faragher/Ellerth Defense
In looking at how victims of harassment respond to this behavior,
I'd like to begin with a rather famous example. When Anita Hill was
questioned by the Senate Judiciary Committee regarding her allegations
of sexual harassment leveled at then Supreme Court nominee Clarence
Thomas, the questions of the Committee typified the discrepancy
between how the courts think victims of sexual harassment should
respond and how sexual harassment victims actually respond to
incidents of harassment. Here are some examples from the hearings:
99. See, e.g., Richard D. Arvey & Marcie A. Cavanaugh, Using Surveys To Assess
the Prevalence ofSexual Harassment: Some Methodological Problems, 51 J. SOC. ISSUES 39,
42 (1995); Welsh, supra note 98, at 171.
100. See, e.g., Patricia A. Frazier et al., Social Science Research on Lay Definitions of
Sexual Harassment, 51 J. Soc. ISSUES 21, 22-23, 25 (1995); Barbara A. Gutek & Mary
P. Koss, Changed Women and Changed Organizations: Consequences of and Coping with
Sexual Harassment, 42 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 28, 41, 43-44 (1993); James M.
Wilkerson, The Impact ofJob Level and Prior Training on Sexual Harassment Labeling and
Remedy Choice, 29 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 1605, 1605-06 (1999).
101. See, e.g., UNITED STATES MERIT SYSTEM PROTECTION BOARD, SExuAL
HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE: TRENDS, PROGRESS, CONTINUING CHALLENGES
(1994) [hereinafter USMSPB].
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Senator Specter: . .. And my question is, understanding of the fact
that you're 25 and that it's your-you're shortly out of law school and
the pressures that exist in this world .... But even considering all of
that, given your own expert standing and the fact that here you have
the chief law enforcement officer of the country on this subject and
the whole purpose of the civil rights law is being perverted right in
the office of the Chairman with one of his own female subordi-
nates-what went through your mind, if anything, on whether you
ought to come forward at that stage, because if you had you'd stop
this man from being head of the EEOC perhaps for another decade.
What went on through your mind? I know you decided not to make
a complaint, but did you give that any consideration, and if so how
could you allow this kind of reprehensible conduct to go on right in
the headquarters without doing something about it?"°
Senator Deconcini: ... [I]f you wouldn't mind repeating to me
what went through your mind, why, number one, you would stay
there after this happened several times, and number two, even though
it ceased for a few months, why you would proceed on to anotherjob
with someone that hadn't just asked you out and pressed you, but had
gotten into the explanations and-expletives and the anatomy and
what have you that you pointed out to us today."°
Senator Simpson: But let me tell you, if what you say this man
said to you occurred, why in God's name, when he left his position of
power or status or authority over you, and you left it in 1983, why in
God's name would you ever speak to a man like that the rest of your
life?'04
Ms. Hill: That's a very good question. And I'm sure that I cannot
answer that to your satisfaction. That is one of the things that I have
tried to do today. I have suggested that I was afraid of retaliation. I
was afraid of damage to my professional life. And I believe that you
have to understand that this response-and that's one of the things
that I have come to understand about harassment-this response, this
kind of response, is not atypical. And I can't explain. It takes an
expert in psychology to explain how that can happen. But it can
happen, because it happened to me.10 5
102. Clarence Thomas Confirmation: Hearing of the S. Judiciary Comm., 102d Cong.
(Oct. 11, 1991) (question from Sen. Arlen Specter to Professor Anita Hill) (LEXIS
Federal News Service).
103. Id. (question from Sen. Dennis Deconcini to Professor Anita Hill).
104. Id. (question from Sen. Alan Simpson to Professor Anita Hill).
105. Id. (testimony of Professor Anita Hill).
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Several themes emerge from these exchanges. Why didn't she come
forward earlier? How could she continue to work for him? Why did she
remain friendly to him? Studies show that Professor Hill's reply to this
interrogation was consistent with what social science tells us about
harassment: her response to the incidents of harassment was typical of
women harassed. Unfortunately, the attitude of the members of the
Senate Judiciary Committee all too often mirrors the attitude ofjudges
who hear these cases. Many judges simply fail to hear and understand
the stories of victims of sexual harassment. Yet, the social context in
which harassment occurs supports the stories of women like Professor
Hill.
Harassment is underreported on two levels. First, women do not
identify their circumstances as harassing. And, even when they do, they
do not report for fear of many bad career and personal ramifications
(ramifications, by the way, that are not unfounded).
There is a gap between what is harassment and employees believing
that their experiences are harassment." s Studies show that particularly
in traditionally female-dominated occupations, where sexual harassment
can be the norm, women do not even identify harassing behaviors as
sexual harassment. One example comes from the nursing profession. In
a study of nurses, a sociologist found that they frequently experience
harassment by doctors and patients, but don't identify it as such."0 7
Studies of female graduate students'03 and temporary clerical workersl°9
have shown similar results. These individuals appear to see harassment
as part of their job.
Even employers who seemingly take harassment seriously find it
difficult to get employees to report harassment. The federal government
makes significant efforts to inform its employees about its sexual
harassment policy."0 Yet, the latest USMSPB study shows that while
106. See Azy Burak et al., Individual Difference Correlates of the Experience of Sexual
Harassment Among Female University Students, 22 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 17, 19-20
(1992) (describing studies showing this).
107. See, e.g., Patricia M. Hanrahan, How Do I Know lfl'm Being Harassed or If This
Is Part of My Job?, 9 NWSA J. 43, 43 (1997) (study of nurses).
108. Louise F. Fitzgerald et al., The Incidence and Dimensions of Sexual Harassment
in Academia and the Workplace, 32 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 152 (1988) (study of female
graduate students).
109. Jackie Krasas Rogers & Kevin D. Henson, "Hey, Why Don't You Wear A Shorter
Skirt?" Structural Vulnerability and the Organization of Sexual Harassment in Temporary
Clerical Employment, 11 GENDER & SOC'Y 215, 231-32 (1997) (study of temporary
workers).
110. See USMSPB, supra note 101, at vii (87% of supervisors and 77% of
[Vol. 24
EVIDENCE OF WOMEN'S STORIES
44% of women and 19% of men reported being harassed, only 12% of
those harassed reported such behavior."' Indeed, this statistic is higher
than what other studies have found. Some have found the reporting rate
as low as 2%. ' The federal government found that rather than reporting
harassment, the most frequent response of victims of harassment is to
ignore it (44%) or engage in other avoidance behavior (avoid harasser-
28%; make a joke of it-15%; go along with the behavior-7%)."3
Only 35% told the harasser to stop."4 Further, only 1% of those filing
charges of harassment with the government resorted to lawsuits. These
findings are fairly consistent with other studies."
5
Generally, women who are sexually harassed go into avoidance
mode. Not only do they not report it, they avoid the entire situa-
tion--often laughing it off, walking away, etc. Unfortunately, these
approaches all too often are seen as "doing nothing" by the courts, and
ultimately hurt victims of harassment in court. But avoidance is not the
equivalent of "doing nothing." In fact, these victims are engaging in a
very active process of avoidance: they often modify their behavior,
including where they go and what they do, in order to avoid confronting
the harasser or the incident.
In addition, there are very good reasons victims do not report
harassment. Studies suggest a number of reasons women fail to report
harassment, including: "[T]hey believe nothing can or will be done, and
many are reluctant to cause problems for the harasser. The most
common reason, however, is fear-fear of retaliation, of not being
believed, of hurting one's career, or of being shamed and humiliated."" 6
nonsupervisory federal employees were trained on the government's sexual harassment
policy; 78% knew the reporting channels; 92% were aware of the sexual harassment
policy).
111. Id. at 14, 30.
112. Sharyn A. Lenhar & Diane K. Shrier, Potential Costs and Benefits of Sexual
Harassment Litigation, 26 PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 132, 132-33 (1996).
113. USMSPB, supra note 101, at 29-30.
114. Id at 30.
115. See Lenhard & Shrier, supra note 112, at 132-33; see also James E. Gruber &
L. Bjorn, Blue-Collar Blues: The Sexual Harassment of Women Autoworkers, 9 WORK &
OCCUPATIONS 271,287 (1982) (reporting results of study of autoworkers showing 23%
ignored harassment, 22% responded mildly, 10% made light of it).
116. Louise F. Fitzgerald et al., Why Didn't She Just Report Him? The Psychological
and Legal Implications of Women's Responses to Sexual Harassment, 51 J. Soc. ISSUES, 117,
122 (1995); see also AMY L. CULBERTSON ET AL., NAVY PERSONNEL RESEARCH &
DEVELOPMENT CENTER, ASSESSMENT OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE NAVY: RESULTS OF
THE 1989 NAVY-WIDE SURVEY 17 (1992) (indicating that common negative reaction
reported by women who complained of harassment was humiliation in front of
others-33% of enlisted women and 34% of officers); Louise F. Fitzgerald, Examining
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Studies show that these fears are not unfounded. In a study of
eighty-eight claims filed with the California Fair Employment and
Housing Department, nearly half of the victims of harassment lost their
jobs and an additional 25% quit due to "fear and frustration.""" So, the
fear of a bad job outcome from pursuing a claim is not unfounded. Other
studies show that up to 10% of women quit their jobs due to sexual
harassment."' Even the USMSPB study supports this. Only 32% of
victims who filed complaints or grievances with the government found
that it made things better; 47% found that it made things worse." 9 In
addition, victims report deterioration of their inter-personal relationships
at work after reporting harassment. 2 Victims are also concerned with
the potential effects on their families-their spouses and children.''
(and Eliminating) the Consequences of Sexual Harassment: An Integrated Model, in SEX AND
POWER IssuEs IN THE WORKPLACE 61, 63 (Northwest Women's Law Center ed., 1992);
Gutek & Koss, supra note 100, at 30; Rebecca A. Thacker, A Descriptive Study of
Situational and Individual Influences upon Individuals' Responses to Sexual Harassment, 49
HuM. REL. 1105, 1116 (1996).
117. Frances S. Coles, Forced To Quit: Sexual Harassment Complaints and Agency
Response, 14 SEx ROLES 81, 89 (1986). But see Gutek & Koss, supra note 100, at 31
(noting the percentage of women who quit, transfer, or are fired due to sexual
harassment al 10%).
118. BARBARA A. GUTEK, SEX AND ThE WORKPLACE: IMPACTOF SEXUAL BEHAVIORAND
HARASSMENT ON WOMEN, MEN AND ORGANIZATIONS 54 (1985); Barbara A. Gutek et al.,
Sexuality in the Workplace, 1 BASIC & APPLIED SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 255, 264 (1980).
Interestingly, this corresponds with the rate of reporting. See supra notes 111-12 and
accompanying text. The original 1981 United States Merit Systems Protection Board
study showed similar results. UNITED STATES MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD,
SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE: IS IT A PROBLEM? (1981). Later
studies show an improvement in this statistic. See USMSPB, supra note 101, at 26.
119. USMSPB, supra note 101, at 30.
120. See, e.g., GuTEK, supra note 118, at 70; Nancy DiTomaso, Sexuality in the
Workplace: Discrimination and Harassment, in THE SEXUALITY OF ORGANIZATIONS 71 (.
Hearn et al. eds., 1989).
121. See Phoebe A. Morgan, Risking Relationships: Understanding the Litigation
Choices of Sexually Harassed Women, 33 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 67, 75, 88 (1999). The
narrative of the plaintiff in Nichols v. Frank provides a chilling example:
I tried to kill myself because I just didn't know how to tell my husband, you
know, what was going on .... I was afraid that he would take my children
and divorce me. And so I was just stuck. I was stuck between the two (the
harasser and her husband] and there was no one I could talk to. I was afraid
other people wouldn't believe me, so I was really stuck with both. Say, if I
went and I told anybody on him, on the supervisor I would lose my job. My
husband and I had just recently bought a house and that house depended on
my earnings, and I didn't want to lose everything. And that job was so
important to the support of my family, so I was just stuck with the two.
42 F.3d 503, 507 (9th Cir. 1994), abrogation on other grounds recognized in Burrell v. Sar
Nursery, Inc., 170 F.3d 951, 955 (9th Cir. 1999). The plaintiff was seeking to explain
why she endured six months of forced sexual conduct with her supervisor. Id. She was
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Even after quitting, victims of harassment face retaliation in the form of
bad references. 2' Harassment has other significant effects too numerous
to detail here on the victims themselves that are not directly related to
work, but often have an effect on their work.'
IV. CONCLUSION:
ACKNOWLEDGING WOMEN'S STORIES IN THE LEGAL STANDARD
Many courts are engaging in assumptions about the manner in
which sexual harassment victims behave." 4 Indeed, in Shaw v. Autozone,
Inc., the Seventh Circuit was blatant about it, stating "[i]n short, Shaw
[the plaintiff] acted in precisely the manner that a victim of sexual
harassment should not act in order to win recovery under the new
law."'2 The plaintiff in Shaw, like the plaintiff in many cases, failed to
apprize her employer of the harassment in a swift enough manner. 26 The
courts in cases such as this, like members of the Senate Judiciary
Committee during the Clarence Thomas nomination hearings, often
make factual and social assumptions about the appropriateness of the
conduct of the victim. What factual support they have for these
assumptions is a mystery. The irony of the federal court's position in
ultimately diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of these incidents.
Id.
Sexual harassment has other effects on its victims. Victims experience a decline
in productivity and the quality of their work. USMSPB, supra note 101, at 25-26. They
become disillusioned with their jobs and their employers. David N. Laband & Bernard
F. Lentz, The Effect ofSexual Harassment on Job Satisfaction, Earnings, and TurnoverAmong
Female Lawyers, 51 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 594,602 (1998). Indeed, the USMSPB has
estimated that harassment costs the federal government $327 million in a two year
period. USMSPB, supra note 101, at 23.
122. See, e.g., Lerond v. Ray F. Weston, Inc., No. CIVASA-99-CA-0521EP, 2000
WL 1707970 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 20, 1999) (granting summary judgment for employer
where employee alleged retaliation based on bad reference due to reporting sexual
harassment); Ford v. Rigidply Rafters, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 386 (D. Md. 1997)
(discussing plaintiff's allegations ofbad references due to reporting sexual harassment).
See generally Matthew J. Cleveland, Comment, Title VII and Negative Job References:
Employees Find Safe Harbor in Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 31 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 521
(1998).
123. Women report not only workplace effects, but also psychological and somatic
effects based on harassment. See Gutek & Koss, supra note 100, at 32-35 (detailing
studies and effects).
124. While it is not true of every court considering prong two ofthe EllerthFaragher
defense, it is certainly true of enough of them to reveal a significant problem entering
in the courts' interpretation of the defense. See supra notes 39 to 51 and accompanying
text.
125. 180 F.3d 806, 813 (7th Cir. 1999) (internal quotations omitted).
126. See id. at 810, 812-13.
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this regard should not be lost on us today. It was Alexander Hamilton
who acknowledged the reason for the federal judiciary's guaranteed
salary and life tenure as "a power over a man's subsistence amounts to
a power over his will.' Yet, women and men who are sexually
harassed are supposed to bravely report such behavior even though it
jeopardizes their job, stand up to their harasser even though they risk
retaliation, and weather the resulting storm like troopers while risking
their psychological well-being. In this essay I have endeavored to deal
with the reality of the experience of harassment and the manner in
which victims respond. 8 It is time for the courts to listen to the stories
of these women and understand the predicament in which sexual
harassment places them.
This is possible under the current affirmative defense standard that
comes out of Ellerth/Faragher. The medical and social context informa-
tion discussed above could be used to explain the victim's behavior,
revealing that it is not unreasonable under prong two of the defense.
This requires practitioners to use these stories effectively, either by
seeking the admission of evidence of PTSD in the appropriate case or
furnishing the courts with the social science testimony necessary to
understand and put in context the victim's response. It also requires the
courts to listen to the stories and understand the context in which sexual
harassment takes place. This should lead to far fewer summary
judgment and judgment as a matter of law motions being granted in the
defendant employer's favor based on the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative
defense.
Of course, even ifthe court allows in evidence regarding a victim's
response to sexual harassment, there is no guarantee that a jury will
understand or believe the story that the victim is attempting to tell.'29
The Senate Judiciary Committee certainly had a hard time believing
Anita Hill. It stands to reason that, if the judiciary is acting on precon-
127. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
128. Aside from the portion of the paper on PTSD, I have not attempted to give an
actual cause of the failure of women to report harassment quickly, although I have
suggested some potential reasons why they might be reluctant to do so. See supra notes
106-22 and accompanying text. The actual causes of this behavior are still being
studied. See, e.g., Joan Acker, Hierarchies, Jobs, Bodies: A Theory of Gendered
Organizations, 4 GENDER& SOC'Y 139 (1990); Barbara A. Gutek & Bruch Morasch, Sex-
Role Spillover, and Sexual Harassment of Women at Work, 38 J. SOCIAL IssUES 55 (1982);
Margaret S. Stockdale et al., Acknowledging Sexual Harassment: A Test of Alternative
Models, 17 BASIC & APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 469 (1995).
129. Hopefully, at least some jurors will comprehend a victim's story because it is
consistent with their experience in seeing or being victims of harassment in the
workplace.
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ceived notions regarding the way victims should behave, then jurors
may as well. This calls for more sweeping reform that shifts the focus
of sexual harassment law away from the acts of the victim and to the
acts of the harasser. Indeed, the themes of these cases often resonate
with those of rape cases prior to rape shield laws. The victim ends up on
trial. A way to avoid this would be to eliminate any affirmative defense
for the employer in cases of supervisor harassment. Indeed, application
of a traditional vicarious liability standard would likely dictate such a
result.'30
While the Court has expressed a clear interest in encouraging
employer compliance, it is not obvious that encouraging employers to
set up policies and thereby avoid liability in the face of an employee not
using such a policy really furthers the overall goal of Title VII: to
eliminate discrimination in the workplace. Instead, it appears to create
a safe haven for employers in which half-hearted attempts at anti-sexual
harassment policies and training might be the likely result.'3' Wouldn't
an employer have even more incentive to train its supervisors and
monitor their conduct for discriminatory practices if it knew it would be
liable in all cases for such acts by its supervisors? Would this discourage
an employer from creating and enforcing such a policy? It seems
unlikely. What it certainly would do is encourage employers to create
an effective policy that actually goes as far as possible to eliminate
discriminatory harassment in the workplace.
130. The Court suggested as much in Ellerth: "On the one hand, a supervisor's
power and authority invests his or her harassing conduct with a particular threatening
character, and in this sense, a supervisor always is aided in the agency relation."
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 763 (1998). In deciding to adopt the
affirmative defense, it sought to balance conflicting principles brought about by its
decision in Meritor and its interpretation of congressional intent. As the Court
explained: "In order to accommodate the agency principles of vicarious liability for
harm caused by misuse of supervisory authority, as well as Title VII's equally basic
policies of encouraging forethought by employers and saving action by objecting
employees, we adopt the following holding in this case." Id. at 764. For an analysis of
how the Court in Ellerth misapplied agency principles, see Kerri Lynn Bauchner, From
Pig in a Parlor to Boar in a Boardroom: Why Ellerth Isn't Working and How Other
Ideological Models Can Help Reconceptualize the Law of Sexual Harassment, 8 COLUM. J.
GENDER& L. 303, 320-23 (1999).
131. See Susan Bisom-Rapp, Fixing Watches with Sledgehammers: The Questionable
Embrace of Employee Sexual Harassment Training by the Legal Profession, 24 U. ARK.
LrInLE RoCK L. REv. 147, 163 (2001) (arguing that there is little to no factual support
for the effectiveness of training in deterring sexual harassment); Susan Bisom-Rapp,
An Ounce of Prevention is a Poor Substitute for a Pound of Cure: Confronting the Developing
Jurisprudence of Education andPrevention in Employment Discrimination Law, 22 BERKELEY
J. ElI. & LAB. L. 1 (2001) (same).
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There are several responses to doing away with the affirmative
defense entirely. One is that this would make employers liable for
situations over which they have no control. Essentially, they are "blind-
sided" by allegations of sexual harassment they know nothing about.
There are several problems with this argument. First, it leaves the victim
of harassment-the person who is the real victim here (not the
employer)-with no remedy for wrongdoing that clearly occurred and
affected her ability to do her job. Why shouldn't the cost of supervisory
sexual harassment be treated the same as other costs of doing business
that involve employee misconduct, for example, a supervisor who fires
someone based on race? Second, it is questionable whether employer
training and policies are really effective to eliminate harassment. Thus,
the courts are giving employers "credit" for actions the results of which
currently are highly questionable. And yet, there is a victim whose life
has been turned upside down based on the actions of a supervisor
employed by that company or business. Her injuries go uncompensated;
her rights go unenforced.
Another response to this is to question where consensual relation-
ships fit into the calculus. The argument seems to be that not all sexual
harassment is non-consensual. This is oxymoronic and based on a
stereotype that is not borne out by any statistical study. If the actions are
sexual harassment, they are, by definition under the legal standard,
unwelcome. There is no such animal as welcome sexual harassment;
unwelcomeness is built into the definition of the claim. Thus, a
consensual relationship will not be viewed as sexual harassment. Indeed,
why would a woman in a consensual relationship bring such allega-
tions?
The idea seems to flow from a paranoid notion that women will
bring sexual harassment claims based on failed consensual relationships.
This idea is unsupported by any study of the phenomenon of sexual
harassment in the workplace. It is also counterintuitive. To bring a claim
and go through the hassle of a lawsuit, including suffering through
discovery, in an effort to extort a settlement or to get back at an ex-
paramour seems highly unlikely. First, there is ample evidence that
women encounter resentment at work and risk their jobs by bringing
such claims. As I have noted above, most women who are harassed do
not even complain, let alone bring lawsuits. Second, even if this did
occur in the rare case, legal standards should not be set based on a rare
exception. Instead, the standard should be set based on what happens in
most cases. Most cases of sexual harassment are brought by women who
believe they have been legitimately wronged.
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Instead, the courts should treat supervisor sexual harassment like
any other supervisor misconduct-as a cost of doing business. In this
manner, victims will be made whole and employers will be encouraged
to adopt policies that are more likely to be effective.

